Musharraf never briefed PM on Kargil operation: Gen (r) Majeed

ISLAMABAD
Former federal minister Lt-Gen (R) Abdul Majeed Malik has written in his book to be launched on March 6 that as Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Pervez Musharraf never gave any prior briefing to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif about the Kargil operation way back in 1999.
The book titled “Hum Bhi Wahan Mojad Thay - Dastan-e-Hayat” (We were also present - biography) covers all martial laws and democratic governments.
It contains some striking observations. It says at the height of tension between Nawaz Sharif and Musharraf the Military Intelligence (MI) bugged the telephones of the prime minister and federal ministers from where clues about the removal of the COAS were got.
According to the book, there were three main characters of the 1999 coup including lieutenant generals Mehmood, Aziz Khan and Usmani. It was stated that when the news of Musharraf’s dismissal and Lt-Gen Ziauddin Butt’s appointment as the COAS was being telecast on the Radio Pakistan, Mehmood and Aziz Khan were playing tennis. Usmani called them from Karachi to inform them about the development. Then, they sprang into action.
The book further says that the nomination of Ziauddin Butt as the COAS was punctured when the gates of the General Headquarters (GHQ) were not opened as he reached there.
Majeed Malik wrote that some people were of the view that addition of Butt to Ziauddin’s name was also a ‘qualification’ for his appointment as the COAS.
When the tussle was at its peak, the book said, the strategy to be adopted if the prime minister brings about changes in the army command was discussed in the corps commanders’ meeting more than once. A plan was also chalked out to meet such situation.
It was also stated that a corps commander passed on this information to Nawaz Sharif. In this connection, many people cite the name of Lt-Gen Tariq Pervaiz, known as TP, (brother of Nadir Pervaiz), who had earlier expressed his strong opposition to the Kargil operation. He was the corps commander Quetta at the time. Musharraf quickly transferred him to the GHQ and subsequently forced the premier to retire him that Nawaz Sharif did reluctantly.
“If I am asked about the reasons, which are many, behind Musharraf’s takeover, I will confidently mention Kargil,” Majeed Malik wrote. “Musharraf’s appointment as the COAS was the choice of the prime minister and his close people bypassing some senior generals.”
He said that misgivings between Musharraf and the prime minister were created in early 1999 when the Kargil war started. The overall Kargil planning was not good. On the one hand, no good results were expected from this planning while on the other Pakistan suffered internationally. The Kargil happened sometime after the historic visit of Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee to Lahore. The breakthrough so achieved received a serious setback by the Kargil conflict.
Majeed Malik said tussle and cold-shouldering began between the premier and COAS sometime after Musharraf’s nomination as the COAS. “Nawaz Sharif and his party had been elected with a heavy majority and that’s way they wanted to have complete control over every national institution. Unfortunately, they did not learn any lessons from their disputes with the judiciary and the president of Pakistan during their previous tenure.”
The author said that while the prime minister appeared satisfied over Vajpayee’s visit as it was the most important and a successful breakthrough, contrary opinion prevailed in the armed forces to some extent as their lack of satisfaction was due to the experiences of the past several years.
He wrote that when in April-May 1999 the situation became very serious, the army command decided to give a regular briefing to the government about the Kargil. The briefing was held at the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Headquarters on May 17 chaired by the prime minister. Apart from Musharraf, senior army officers including Mehmood, Aziz Khan, Javed Hassan, Tauqir Zia and Nadeem attended it. Government representatives - Majeed Malik, Sartaj Aziz, Raja Zafarul Haq, Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, Lt-Gen (R) Iftikhar Ali Khan, Shamshad Ahmed and Tariq Fatemi - were also present.
According to the writer, Sartaj Aziz opposed the Kargil war saying that as foreign minister it would be difficult for him to defend the conflict globally. Defence Secretary Iftikhar Ali Khan said if this war spread, Pakistan didn’t have military resources to bear it. So, he too opposed the Kargil war. Majeed Malik said this war could be damaging for Pakistan and the chances of its success were nonexistent.
“Over my observation, Musharraf vigorously briefed with the use of his stick on the maps about the strong position of Pakistan. I mentioned about India’s strong line of communication and said by collecting armoury and use of Air Force India could blow us up,” the author wrote.
Majeed Malik wrote that the prime minister attentively listened to the briefing but did not express his final opinion. “Nawaz Sharif neither showed any clear reaction nor did he ask many questions. He only asked: Is our position strong? Replying, Mehmood, Aziz and others said we are very strong.”
The author also wrote about the appointment of Ziaul Haq as COAS by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (ZAB) and how he narrowly missed the opportunity to clinch the top slot. Majeed Malik was on sixth number of the list of seniority while Ziaul Haq was at the bottom.
“When in the presence of Ghulam Mustafa Khar, ZAB indicated me to name me as the COAS, I sought an interview with him. I was called on the second day. The meeting was kept secret. I told Bhutto that five generals are senior to me and every one of them has an average of 35-year service. If I was made the army chief, the 175 years’ military experience of these five generals would go waste. Therefore, my opinion is that the most senior general, Mohammad Sharif, should be made the COAS. Bhutto said he was taking this decision in his capacity of supreme commander in the national interest and what he knows that Majeed Malik doesn’t.”
The writer mentions different moves of Ziaul Haq that he made to come close to Bhutto. One of them was making Bhutto colonel-in-chief, which was unusual because this honorary office is given only to a retired army officer. He claimed that the six intelligence agencies that existed at the time opposed his appointment in their reports to the prime minister saying that he was a strong man, who can be a risk for the government. Only ISI had not sent any such report.
In those days, differences had developed between Bhutto and Khar. At a Liaquat Bagh Rawalpindi public meeting, Khar crushed a snake under his feet and said he would do so with ‘snakes’. At the end of the rally, the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) tried to catch Khar but he fled in his car to the western side on the GT Road. Khar evaded the arrest. It was speculated that Khar has taken refuge with Peshawar corps commander Majeed Malik, who is his friend. But in reality, Khar had hidden himself in Hayat Sherpao’s residence.
Majeed Malik said that in end-1975, he attended wedding reception of the son of President Fazal Elahi. Khar, who was also present there, met him. At the time, Bhutto and Khar were on a warpath. As sirens heralded the arrival of the prime minister, Khar told Majeed Malik to go away otherwise it would create misunderstanding about him in Bhutto’s mind.
“What is the use of becoming my COAS if this small thing will create mistrust? Now I will keep standing here. After meeting different people, Bhutto shook hands with Khar and me with impressions on his face having changed,” the author said. Agencies also reported that Ziaul Haq was a harmless and decent person. After sometime, he was nominated as the COAS.