Tue, Jun 18, 2013, Shaban 08, 1434 A.H. : Last updated 1 hour ago
 
 
Group Chairman: Mir Javed Rahman

Editor-in-Chief: Mir Shakil-ur-Rahman
 
 
 
 
 
 
Shoaib A Raja and Usman Manzoor
Friday, December 16, 2011
From Print Edition
 
 

 

ISLAMABAD: The central character of the memogate scandal, Mansoor Ijaz, a US national of Pakistani origin, submitted his 81-page written reply in the Supreme Court on Thursday with documentary evidences to establish his claims made in the memo issue.

 

The reply was submitted in response to the Supreme Court’s Dec 1 order in the memogate controversy. According to the documentary evidence (communication log form) he annexed with his written reply, as many as 85 communications, including phone calls and BlackBerry messages, took place between him and former ambassador to US Husain Haqqani during May 9 to May 12, 2011.

 

According to communication log he annexed with his written reply, the first communication was initiated by Haqqani on May 5, 2009 with the contents, “Are you in London? I am here just for 36 hours. Can we meet for after dinner coffee or s’thing. The last communication made by Haqqani to Ijaz on May 12, 2011 was, “Thanx. On way to Isloo. Will touch base on return”.

 

About contact with Pakistani officials, Mansoor Ijaz said, “While I maintain high-level political and military/intelligence contacts in nearly two dozen countries around the world, during the past decade, I have had no contact with any Pakistani government officials, civilian, judicial, military or intelligence — with the four exceptions (ambassador Haqqani excluded) — A: in 2003 when I last interacted with the former DG ISI Gen Ehsanul Haq, shortly before he left the DG ISI position in 2004.

 

B: Nov 2005 when my friend and I visited the prime minister of Pakistan and some military officers during and after our trip to Kashmir as the earthquake reconstruction period began.

 

C: May 5, 2009 when I met with President Asif Ali Zardari for 45-50 minutes at the Willard Intercontinental Hotel in Washington DC at the invitation of ambassador Haqqani to brief the president shortly before he met with US officials at the White House.

 

D: Oct 22, 2011 when I met alone with ISI chief Lt Gen Ahmed Shuja Pasha at his request for approximately four hours in London to provide him with the same accounting of facts provided to the court.

 

He said over the past decade, he maintained regular contact with Haqqani through e-mail, BlackBerry chat exchanges, SMS, in-person meetings and telephonic discussions. He said he, purely being a friend, had been assisting Haqqani in communicating his messages in ways that only he dictated. In his reply, he also submitted two PIN numbers of Haqqani’s unique Blackberry. He said in response to Haqqani’s request, he had made a 16:03 minute long call to Haqqani on Sept 5, 2011.

 

He also stated that after the publication of his article in Financial Times, Haqqani called him and told him that General Pasha was coming to London. He said he met with General Pasha on October 22, 2011 at the Park Lane Hotel, London, for four hours and shared the facts with him, besides providing all the evidences and record about the “memorandum”.

 

He said General Pasha had made it clear that he was in London with the consent of army chief General Kayani. He said he had told General Pasha that he had been assisting Haqqani in transmitting the messages to Admiral Mullen. He said, “I also made clear to General Pasha that I did not want to be personally involved in any debriefing of him that would lead to a disruption of the civilian government’s normal business — he responded by making clear that it was his and Kayani’s deep desire to see a government complete its term, but that the rumours of what was contained in the ‘memorandum’ from a content perspective could simply not be ignored.” On this basis, he said, he had agreed and started meeting with General Pasha and told him the truth.

 

According to a handwritten note by Haqqani and given to Mansoor Ijaz, “US-Brits will beat shut out to get info out”, “Army wants to bring government down”, Msg to Kayani 1971 moment... Let President order inquiry ... Let debate occur... coalition of willing US helps on Afghanistan ... Pakistan doesn’t know what it wants ... Biden gave blank sheet to Pak agents on nukes/Kashmir which Kayani threw out”.

 

“Msg to Kayani- Let AZ do: (a) inquiry into what happened (b) Find out who is there...Let America do special ops (c) Won’t take nukes, need some discipline (d) We will help directorate S of ISI.”

 

Mansoor Ijaz’s statement in the Supreme Court of Pakistan mentions how ISI chief examined the evidence in memogate scandal in London and that according to Husain Haqqani, Ijaz was ‘plausibly deniable’ if ever anything got leaked.

 

Ijaz has also offered to disclose some names in an in-camera appearance in the court. Mansoor’s statement also discloses that he has sent all the data of communication with Haqqani for forensic examination.

 

Regarding the meeting with General Pasha, Mansoor says that he was contacted by a person whose name he does not know to this day on 16 October who asked about his willingness to meet General Pasha. After asking the purpose and discussing with in-house legal counsel, Mansoor agreed to meet the ISI chief. Interestingly, both had taken the batteries out of their telephones and placed them in the drawers to avoid being bugged. “General Pasha read the memo in three to four minutes, demonstrated surprise and dismay — at times disgust and disappointment — over the content of the document. He then carefully analysed dates, times, properties of my Microsoft documents to see when the documents were created and how they fit into the timeline I was stating, looked at the original telephone bill logs, checked the time at which each BBM message was sent or received and reviewed my handwritten notes”, Mansoor Ejaz’s statement states.

 

General Pasha did ask to see how Ijaz stored e-mail addresses and to see the ones he had for Haqqani — one from his (Haqqani) private university mailbox (Boston Univ) and one for official use at the embassy in Washington.

 

Regarding contacts with Haqqani, Ijaz has written that over the past decade he has kept good contacts with Haqqani. “Often after 9-11 attacks, when I was not available for media appearances due to calendar conflicts, I would refer producers to Haqqani as a qualified expert on Pakistan affairs. Haqqani was helpful and supportive in other important matters, including speaking at one of my charity’s annual fundraising dinners in June 2009.”

 

He disclosed that “I have been informed by two important official sources (Whom I shall identify “In Camera”) that attempts may have been or are being made to manipulate, erase, delete or otherwise distort data in the electronic devices of Haqqani that could confirm the data I have provided herein as fact.”

 

Regarding the question why Haqqani chose Ijaz, the statement says, “He said I was plausibly deniable as a conduit and that no one would ever believe — if this got public in those days — he had come to me for such kind of help.”

 

Mansoor has written that Haqqani called him after the Financial Times article to inform that he had just learned that Gen. Pasha was coming to London. Haqqani feared that Pasha would meet the editors of Financial Times.